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NOTES
IF YOU BUILD IT, CAN THEY SUE? ARCHITECTS'
LIABILITY UNDER TITLE 1II OF THE ADA
James P. Colgate*
INTRODUCTION

Can an architect' who designs a building in violation of the
accessibility requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act2
("ADA" or "Act") be held liable for discrimination? Since the
passage of the ADA in 1990, that question has elicited a range of
contradictory rulings.
Liability for inadequate design has long been recognized. In
ancient Babylonia, a master builder3 was put to death if the owner of a
house died from its collapse; if the owner's son died, the builder's son
Although no state today imposes such harsh
was put to death
* Registered Architect licensed to practice in the state of New York, technical
staff with the New York City Department of Buildings, and J.D. Candidate, Evening
Division, Fordham University School of Law. The views expressed herein are my
own. I would like to thank Professor Katherine Franke, Carolyn Jackson, and Kristin
Kiehn, and also my lover David Fields for being so patient. I would also like to credit
Emily Alexander's footnote number 223 for providing the initial inspiration. See
Emily Alexander, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act and State Prisons: A
Question of Statutory Interpretation, 66 Fordham L Rev. 2233, 2263 n.223 (1998)
(noting the emerging split on architects' liability under the ADA). Additional
inspiration has come from working in city government for many years, where I dealt
with hundreds of private architects, several of whom resented the ADA, treating it as
an unreasonable imposition.
1. This Note focuses primarily on architects, although similar if not identical
analyses may be made for engineers and other design professionals, see Bibb Allen,
Liabilities ofArchitects and Engineersto Third Parties,22 Ark. L Rev. 454,454 (1968)
(noting that legal principles regarding liability that apply to architects generally apply
to engineers), and, in some cases, franchisors and contractors, see infra Part I.B-C.
2. See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-336,104
Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213,47 U.S.C. §§ 225,611 (1994)).
3. The historical master builder controlled all aspects of design and construction.
See Jay A. Felli, Comment, The Elements of Ohio's Liability Provisions for
ContemporaryDesign-Build Ardcitects-An Unwillingness to Expand the Plan, 17 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 109, 111 (1991).
4. See Robert Francis Harper, The Code of Hammurabi: King of Babylon §§
229-230, at 81 (Win. W. Gaunt & Sons 1994) (1904). The law read:
If a builder build a house for a man and do not make its construction firm,
and the house which he has built collapse and cause the death of the owner

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

penalties, architects are nonetheless held accountable under
negligence theories of liability to foreseeable users of the buildings
that they design. 5 Thus, an architect who negligently designs a
stairwell with inadequate handrails can be liable for injuries to a
person who falls on the stairs as a result of this deficiency.6 An
architect who negligently designs a building
that collapses on a person
7
can be found guilty of manslaughter.
Licensed, trained professionals are thus charged with the important
duty of safe building design, and are held accountable in causes of
action arising under negligence to persons injured as a result of the
unsafe design of their buildings. In causes of action brought under the
ADA, however, some courts ascribe liability to the architect while
others do not. This Note examines the arguments for and against such
liability, and argues that architects should be held accountable for the
inaccessibility of the buildings they design and are proper defendants
in suits alleging discrimination resulting from designs that are noncompliant with the ADA.
Courts addressing the issue of architects' liability under the ADA
have focused on section 303(a), which makes the design and
construction of inaccessible commercial facilities a discriminatory
practice.' Some courts have adhered to a literal, textual interpretation
of section 303(a), assigning liability only to owners, lessees, lessors,
and operators of buildingsg--a reading that excludes architects from
of the house, that builder shall be put to death.
If it cause the death of a son of the owner of the house, they shall put to
death a son of that builder.
If it cause the death of a slave of the owner of the house, he shall give to
the owner of the house a slave of equal value.
If it destroy property, he shall restore whatever it destroyed, and because
he did not make the house which he built firm and it collapsed, he shall
rebuild the house which collapsed from his own property [i.e., at his own
expense].
If a builder build a house for a man and do not make its construction meet
the requirements and a wall fall in, that builder shall strengthen that wall at
his own expense.
Id. §§ 229-233, at 81, 83, (alteration by Harper). The Code apparently placed no
value on the life of the wife or daughter of the owner. See id.
5. See generally Constance Frisby Fain, Architect and Engineer Liability, 35
Washburn L.J. 32 (1995) (discussing the scope of architects' and engineers' liability).
6. See, e.g., Montijo v. Swift, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133, 134-35 (Ct. App. 1963). In
Montijo, an architect designed a stairway with handrails that did not extend to the
bottom of the steps, thereby giving the false impression that the plaintiff had reached
the bottom. See id. at 134. The court held that the architect owed a duty to the
plaintiff and remanded the case to trial. See id. at 135.
7. See, e.g., State v. Ireland, 20 A.2d 69, 70 (N.J. 1941) ("An architect, through
neglect or violation of a building code by the preparation of defective plans for a
building, which collapses due to his fault, is subject to indictment for manslaughter
where an occupant has been killed through his neglect.").
8. See ADA § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (1994)).
9. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615-16 (E.D.
Ky. 1998) (holding that section 303(a) is limited to owners, lessees, lessors, and
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liability. Most of these courts have also strictly construed section
303(a) to impose liability only on those who both "design and
construct"'" a facility, thus excusing from liability anyone who designs
but does not construct that facility." These narrow interpretations of
the ADA are examples of what some deem a growing trend of judicial
backlash against the ADA and civil rights laws in general. 2
Part I of this Note describes the enactment of the ADA, and
contrasts its broad purpose with the narrow judicial interpretations
that have sought to limit or invalidate it. Part II introduces sections
302(a) and 303(a) of the ADA, and explains the conflict in the
statutory language between these two provisions that has resulted in a
split of authority on architects' liability for non-compliant design and
construction. Part ]I then contrasts the arguments advanced by courts
that have exempted architects from liability under section 303(a) with
those that have found liability. Part II argues that interpreting the
language of the ADA broadly, and thus holding architects liable for
non-compliant design, is both consistent with the intent of Congress in
passing the ADA and follows from a proper interpretation of the
statutory text itself. Part III examines the role of the architect in
designing buildings in legal compliance with acceptable codes and
practices, and concludes that interpreting the ADA as holding
architects liable for failure to design compliant buildings is consistent
with this important role.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, TEXTUALISM, AND JUDICIAL

BACKLASH

This part provides a brief history of the ADA's enactment and
describes the trend toward "judicial backlash" decisions limiting the
scope of the ADA. This part then examines how this trend has
impacted the question of architect's liability.
The ADA's stated purpose was to comprehensively eliminate
discrimination 3 against the estimated 43 million Americans with
disabilities 14 by legislating clear, consistent, and enforceable
operators); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (California DIA) 8 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 493 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) (same), appeal docketed,

No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1998); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket
Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (same), affd on other
grounds sub non. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena LP., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C.

Cir. 1997); see also infra Part II.C.
10. ADA § 303(a)(1) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1)).
11. See California DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 492 & n.1 (holding that
under section 303(a), only owners lessors, lessees, and operators of commercial
facilities who also both design and construct a facility may be liable); Paralyzed

Veterans ofAm., 945 F. Supp. at 2 (same); see also infra Part II.B-C.
12. See infra Part I.

13. See ADA § 2(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
14. See id. § 2(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)). The term "disability" is

defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
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standards. 15 The Act, dubbed the "emancipation proclamation" for
the disabled 16 and "the most sweeping piece of civil rights legislation
possible in the history of our country, but certainly since the Civil War
era, '"17 passed in 1990 with overwhelming majorities in both the House
and Senate.1 8 President Bush signed it into law amid great fanfare at
an emotional ceremony at the White House, stating:
And now I sign legislation which takes a sledgehammer to another
wall, one which has for too many generations separated Americans
with disabilities from the freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp.
Once again, we rejoice as this barrier falls for claiming together we
will not accept, we will not excuse, we will not tolerate
discrimination in America.... Let the shameful wall of exclusion
finally come tumbling down.19
The ADA comprises five titles. Title I, "Employment," covers
issues relating to employment and prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals in
hiring, compensation, discharge, and job assignment. 20 Title II,
"Public Services," prohibits discrimination by public entities in
providing access to services, programs, and activities, and covers
almost every state or local government subdivision in areas such as
transportation, access to public buildings, public benefits and
programs, and public employment.21
Title III, "Public
Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities,"
mandates access to privately owned businesses and other
establishments. 2 Title III was included after testimony illustrating
that "an overwhelming majority of individuals with disabilities lead
isolated lives and do not frequent places of public accommodation."'
Specifically, Congress explained that "[t]he large majority of people
with disabilities do not go to movies, do not go to the theatre, do not
'24
go to see musical performances, and do not go to sports events.
major life activities... (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." Id. § 3(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
15. See Id. § 2(b)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)).
16. See 135 Cong. Rec. 8505, 8506 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
17. 135 Cong. Rec. 19,833,19,847 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
18. The vote was 355-58 in the House of Representatives. See 136 Cong. Rec.
17,251, 17,280 (1990). The vote was 91-6 in the Senate. See 136 Cong. Rec. 17,364,
17,376 (1990).
19. Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1162, 1164-65 (July 26, 1990).
20. See ADA §§ 101-108 (comprising Title I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1211112117).
21. See id. §§ 201-246 (comprising Title II) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165).
22. See id. §§ 301-318 (comprising Title III) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1218112189).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 34 (1990) (citing the National Council on
Disability), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,316.

24. Id.
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Title IV, "Telecommunications," requires access for the hearing- and
speech-impaired to certain telecommunications systems?6 Title V,
"Miscellaneous Provisions," includes provisions on plaintiffs'
remedies, retaliation, agency regulations, and alternate dispute
resolution. 6
Some courts have interpreted provisions of the ADA broadly,
consistent with the ADA's stated purpose of eliminating
discrimination against individuals with disabilities?' For instance, in
Bragdon v. Abbott, 8 a dentist refused to treat an asymptomatic LiVpositive patient in his office.29 Although the Court did not rely heavily
on the statute's remedial purpose or on Congress's intent that the
ADA protect people with FIV,3 it nonetheless held that
asymptomatic HIV may be a disability 1 In Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp.,' the Court considered whether the
ADA's Title I employment provisions protect an individual who at
the same time qualifies for Social Security Disability Insurance
("SSDI") benefits?3 Although an individual must be unable to work
in order to receive SSDI, an individual must be able to perform the
essential job functions with reasonable accommodation to prevail
under an employment discrimination claim under ADA's Title I.
Citing differences in the statutes, the Court held that "an SSDI claim
and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side."35
In spite of decisions like Bragdon and Cleveland, many judges
presiding over ADA claims appear reluctant to endorse either
Congress's broad mandate or its explicitly stated intentions, and are
instead dismissing ADA cases. 36 This "backlash"'3 is viewed as part of
25. See ADA §§ 401-402 (comprising Title IV) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611

(1994)).
26. See id. §§ 501-514 (comprising Title V) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213).
Additional miscellaneous provisions include a section making clear that the ADA
does not find homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism, or transexualism a disability,
conveniently lumping these with pedophilia, compulsive gambling, kleptomania,

pyromania, and disorders from illegal drug use. See id. § 511 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12211).
27. See id. § 2(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
28. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
29. See id. at 2201.
30. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L

(forthcoming 2000) (noting that Justice Kennedy in Bragdon ruled without reliance
on the statute's remedial goals or legislative history, instead using the legislative
history only to confirm, but not guide, his textually-based interpretations).
31. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2201.
32. 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999).
33. See id. at 1599.

34. See id.
35. Id. at 1602.
36. See Matthew Diller, JudicialBacklash, die ADA, and the Civil Rights Model,
21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. (forthcoming 2000).

37. The pattern of judicial rulings refusing to enforce the ADA has raised concern
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a larger trend of skepticism toward civil rights laws in general,
including affirmative action and sexual orientation non-discrimination
laws, which are seen as conferring special rights or subsidies on classes
of people.3s Fueling this trend in the case of the ADA are businesses
that are reluctant to meet ADA requirements 39 and the media's
publicizing of frivolous claims.4" In addition, courts' failure to
recognize that the ADA is derived from a civil rights model intended
to promote equality has allowed ideological skepticism toward the
ADA to foment.41
Layered over this ideological framework is the growing use by the

courts of "textualism" in statutory interpretation. 4 As a method of
statutory construction, textualism "discounts extra-textual sources of

interpretation in favor of 'plain meaning' constructions. 4 3 For
example, the Supreme Court recently dismissed, on textual grounds,
ADA employment claims by plaintiffs who would be disabled but for
mitigating measures, such as corrective eyeglasses or medication.'
in the academic community, so much so that in March 1999 the Berkeley Journal of
Employment and Labor Law sponsored a symposium: Backlash Against the ADA:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies. See
Backlash Against the ADA (visited June 11, 1999) <http://www.law.berkeley.
edu/academics/csj/symposium>. The symposium included thirty-one speakers. See id.
at
<http:/www.law.berkeley.edu/academics/csj/symposiumlspeakers.html>.
The
thirteen papers presented will be published in the Berkeley Journal of Employment
and Labor Law. See id. at <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/academics/csj/symposium/
abstracts.html>.
38. See Diller, supra note 36.
39. See Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with
Disabilities,Illness and ParentingResponsibilities under United States Law, 9 Yale J.L.
& Feminism 213, 213 ("The backlash against the [ADA] ...has been immediate and
strong. Exaggeration and misstatement have been rampant from the leaders of
American capitalism.").
40. See id. at 251 ("[Conservative newspapers have fueled this backlash by
exaggerating the scope of success for claimants under the ADA.").
41. See Diller, supra note 36 (arguing that "the courts do not fully grasp, let alone
accept, the ADA's reliance on a civil rights model for addressing problems that
people with disabilities face in the workplace").
Cases cited at the Berkeley
symposium as examples of a "backlash" against the ADA typically involve seemingly
valid claims that are nonetheless dismissed on technicalities, often by a finding that
the plaintiff does not qualify as disabled under the ADA. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a woman with breast
cancer who suffered side effects from chemotherapy was not disabled under the ADA
because she continued to work despite her impairments); Schulter v. Industrial Coils,
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that an insulin-dependant
diabetic was not disabled under the ADA because medication controlled or lessened
the impairment to the point the diabetes no longer restricted a major life activity).
42. See Parmet, supra note 30 (discussing the increasing influence of textualism as
a method of statutory interpretation in federal courts).
43. Wendy E. Parmet, Abstract, Plain Meaning and MitigatingMeasures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability (visited June 11, 1999) <http://www.
law.berkeley.edulacademics/csj/symposium/papers/parmet.html>.
44. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139,2150 (1999) (holding that
two pilots with severe myopia were not "disabled" under the ADA because their
corrective lenses removed the disability). The Court made a similar ruling the same
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In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,45 the defendant airline declared
two myopic sisters unqualified to serve as commercial airline pilots.!
With corrective lenses, their vision functioned identically to
individuals without visual impairments.47 Focusing on the precise
wording of ADA provisions, the majority found that the petitioners
were not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.' in part due to
the grammatical construction of the Act's definition of disability as an
"impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities. ' 49 Because the phrase is in the "present indicative '", verb
tense, the majority held that while an individual who uses corrective
lenses is impaired, that impairment does not presently substantially
limit a major life activity.5 ' The majority explicitly refused to consider
the legislative history of the ADA, which, the dissent pointed out, is
"replete with references to the understanding that the Act's protected
class includes individuals with various medical conditions that
ordinarily are perfectly 'correctable' with medication or treatment. ' 5
In Sutton, the Court addressed the issue of disability itself, rather
than who is liable under the Act for violations in building design.
Nonetheless, its hypertextual interpretations of the ADA's language
are further examples of the judicial trend toward "plain-meaning"
construction that often goes so far as to contradict Congress's plainlystated intent. Similarly narrow "backlash" interpretations do address
liability for discrimination in designing or constructing non-compliant
privately owned commercial facilities.5s The next part outlines the
day in Murphy v. United ParcelService Inc, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999) (holding that

a mechanic with high blood pressure was not disabled under the ADA because his
medication remedied the disability).
45. 119 S. Ct. 2139.
46. See id. at 2143.
47. See id. at 2150.
48. See id.
49. ADA § 3(2)(A) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
(1994)).
50. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
51. See id. at 2146-47.
52. See id. at 2146 ("Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be
read in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history.");
see also infra text accompanying notes 203-05 (criticizing the Court for ignoring
congressional intent in Sutton).
53. Id. at 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also, eg., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. H,

at 52 (1990) ("Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to
the availability of mitigating measures such as reasonable accommodations or

auxiliary aids."), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.
III, at 28 (1990) (stating that in determining whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity, "[tihe impairment should be assessed without considering

whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations,
would result in a less-than-substantial limitation"), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 451; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) ("[W]hether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as

reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.").
54. See infra Part HI.B-C.
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provisions in the ADA relating to architects' liability, examines the
conflicting decisions interpreting these provisions, and argues in favor
of the rulings by courts finding architects liable for discrimination for
building design in violation of the ADA.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: ADA SECTIONs 302(a) AND

303(a)
This part outlines sections 302(a) and 303(a) of the ADA, the two
sections that have triggered differing interpretations of the parameters
of liability for non-compliant newly constructed buildings. It then
discusses courts' varying approaches to the questions of whether a
liable party under section 303(a) must both design and construct a
facility, and whether section 303(a) applies only to owners, lessees,
lessors, and operators of privately owned buildings. This part argues
that a broad interpretation of section 303(a), which would find
architects liable for non-compliant design, is consistent with
Congress's intent and proper interpretation of the statute itself.
A.

Sections 302(a) and 303(a) of the ADA

Title III of the ADA features two overlapping provisions that
define discriminatory conduct relating to privately owned facilities:
sections 302(a) and 303(a). Section 302(a) states:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns,55 leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.

This section applies to existing places of public accommodation,
including restaurants, bars, retail stores, hotels, and movie theaters. 6
It requires that owners, lessees, lessors, and operators of places of
public accommodation affirmatively act to, among other things,
remove architectural barriers where such removals are "readily
achievable."57 It does not apply to existing "commercial facilities"
that are not places of public accommodation, such as office buildings,
55. ADA § 302(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994)).
56. See id. § 301(7) (defining public accommodations) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (same).
57. See ADA § 302(b)(2)(A)(iv) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)).
Readily achievable "means easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without
much difficulty or expense." Id. § 301(9) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9)); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104. Determinations of what is readily achievable are made on a case-by-case
basis depending on the available resources of the owner, lessor, lessee, or operator of
the place of public accommodation. See ADA § 301(9) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12181(9)); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. For a thorough discussion of what is readily achievable,
see Kari L. Rutherford, Comment, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct (ADA); Title
III: "What is Readily Achievable?",22 W. St. U. L. Rev. 329 (1995).
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factories, and storage facilities.5 8 The ADA affects these existing
office buildings and factories only to the extent that an employer must
make reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee pursuant to
Title V 9
Under section 303(a), by contrast, any newly constructed or altered
facility, including both new places of public accommodation and all

other new commercial facilities, must be designed and constructed to
the higher standard of "readily accessible... and usable. ''W Section

303(a) states:
[A]s applied to public accommodations and commercial facilities,
discrimination for the purposes of section 302(a) includes(1) a failure to design and construct facilities.., that are readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities... and
(2) ... a failure to make alterations in such a manner that, to the
maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are
readily accessible to and usable by individuals vith disabilities .... rP

Thus, with the enactment of sections 302(a) and 303(a) in 1990,
Congress envisioned that all existing places of public accommodation
would be made accessible to the disabled to the extent that
modifications are readily achievable by their owners, lessees, lessors,
or operators. In addition, all newly constructed commercial facilities,
including new places of public accommodation, would from the outset
be designed and constructed to be completely "readily accessible to
and usable by"' persons with disabilities." Section 303(a) has an
"intended conceptual connection"'
to Title I's employment
provisions in that the section's accessibility and usability
58. "Commercial Facilities" are broadly defined to include all facilities that are
intended for non-residential use and whose operations affect commerce. See ADA §
301(2) (defining commercial facilities) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2)); 28 C.F.R. §
36.104 (same).
59. See generally ADA §§ 101-108 (comprising Title I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§

12111-12117); see also infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the link

between ADA section 303(a) and Title I).
60. ADA § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)). The standard of readily
accessible and usable is more stringent than the readily achievable standard applied to
existing places of public accommodation. See supra note 57. To be readily accessible
and usable, all portions of the facility, whether for public accommodation or not, must

be accessible and usable, except "only in those rare circumstances when the unique

characteristics of terrain" make incorporation of accessibility features structurally
impracticable. 28 C.F.R. § 36.401(c)(1).
61. ADA § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)).
62- Id.
63. See H. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 63 (1990) ("The ADA is geared to the
future-the goal being that, over time, access will be the rule rather than the

exception. Thus, the bill only requires modest expenditures to provide access in

existing facilities, while requiring all new construction to be accessible."), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,486.
64. H.R- Rep. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 117 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303,400.
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requirements, which new office buildings and other commercial
facilities must meet, makes providing reasonable accommodation to
disabled employees easier.65
Section 302(a) explicitly states who may be liable under its
provisions.66 The section is enforceable only against "any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation." 67 Liability under section 303(a), however, is not
delineated. 68 Section 303(a) merely defines discrimination as a failure
to design and construct facilities in a manner that is accessible and
usable.6 9 This discrepancy is at the center of the debate surrounding
architects' liability.
In addressing architects' liability under section 303(a), some courts
have examined whether only those who both design and construct a
commercial facility may be held liable. The narrow textual view
strictly interprets the plain language of section 303(a)'s phrase "design
and construct" as necessarily conjunctive, and thus holds a party liable
only if she both designs and constructs a facility. 70 Under this view, an
architect who designs but does not construct a privately owned facility
would not be held liable for discrimination under the ADA for a noncompliant design. The broader view holds that "design and construct"
should be read, functionally if not grammatically, as "design or
construct," so that either the designer or constructor may be liable.7
Under this broader view, a designing architect may be held liable for a
non-compliant design, even if she did not also construct the facility.
The second and more fundamental analysis examines whether
proper defendants are limited solely to owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators of privately owned commercial facilities. The narrow view
65. See id. ("To the extent that new facilities are built in a manner that make [sic]
them accessible to all individuals, including potential employees, there will be less of a

need for individual employers to engage in reasonable accommodations for particular
employees.").
66. See ADA § 302(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
67. Id.
68. See id. § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)).

69. See id.
70. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (8th Circuit DIA), 151 F.3d 822,
825 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that under section 303(a) only one who both designs

and constructs a facility may be liable), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1249 (1999); United
States v. Days Inns of Am. (CaliforniaDIA), 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 492
n.1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) (same), appeal docketed, No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17,
1998); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F.
Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (same), affd on other grounds sub nom. Paralyzed Veterans
of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also infra Part II.B
(sane).
71. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (Illinois DIA), 997 F. Supp. 1080,
1083-84 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that under section 303(a) either a designer or a
constructor may be liable); Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175,

1178 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting architect's argument that "design and construct"
should be read conjunctively); see also infra Part II.B (same).
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strictly construes the plain language of section 303(a)'s reference to
section 302(a)l to hold only owners, lessees, lessors, and operators 3
liable for non-compliant design. 4 The alternative and broader view
holds that any party, and not simply owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators, may be liable under section 303(a).75 Under this broad
interpretation, section 303(a)'s reference to section 302(a)76 is
interpreted solely as a definition of discrimination, and not as an
assignation of liability.
The first district court to rule on the scope of liability under section
303(a) of the ADA was the District of Columbia in 1996 in Paralyzed
Veterans of America v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers, P. C.
("PVA"). In PVA, plaintiffs brought suit against the architect as well
as the owners and operators"8 of the MCI Center,79 seeking

declaratory and injunctive reliefPm Plaintiffs alleged that the design
and construction of the arena, which was then being erected, violated
section 303(a) of the ADA."1 The court granted the defendant
72. See ADA § 303(a) ("[A]s applied to public accommodations and commercial
facilities, discrimination for purposes of section 302(a) includes... a failure to design
and construct facilities ...that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities...." (emphasis added)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)).
73. See id.§ 302(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against.., by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."
(emphasis added)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
74. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615-16 (E.D.
Ky. 1998) (holding that section 303(a) is limited to owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators); California DLA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 493-94 (same);
Paralyzed Veterans ofAn., 945 F. Supp. at 2 (same); see also infra Part ll.C.
75. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 825 (holding that section 303(a) is not limited
to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators); Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. at 1084-85
(same); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (D. Minn. 1997)
(same); Johanson,963 F. Supp. at 1178 (same); see also infra Part II.C (same).
76. See ADA § 303(a) ("[A]s applied to public accommodations and commercial
facilities, discrimination for purposes of section 302(a) includes ... a failure to design
and construct facilities. . . that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities .... " (emphasis added)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)).
77. 945 F. Supp. 1.
78. The case originally had eight defendants: Ellerbe Becket Architects &
Engineers, P.C.; Ellerbe Becket, Inc.; D.C. Arena Associates, Inc.; D.C. Arena, L.P.;
Washington Sports and Entertainment, Inc.; Centre Group, L.P.; Abe Pollin Sports,
Inc.; and Abe Pollin. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects &
Eng'rs, P.C., 950 F. Supp 393, 396 (D.D.C. 1996) (listing all original defendants), affd
sub nom Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena LP., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
79. The MCI Center is a sports and multi-purpose arena which is now home to the
National Basketball Association's Wizards and the National Hockey League's
Capitals.
80. See Paralyzed Veterans ofAm., 945 F. Supp. at 1.
81. See id. at 1-2. Although the architects were ultimately dismissed from the
case, see id. at 2-3, the court did hold in a subsequent ruling that the arena had been
designed in violation of section 303(a) of the ADA in that a substantial number of the
wheelchair seats did not provide unobstructed views for disabled patrons when the
non-disabled patrons stood up. See Paralyzed Veterans of An., 950 F. Supp at 405.
For a thorough discussion and critical review of the PVA's line-of-sight requirements,
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architects' motions to dismiss, holding that an architect may not be
liable under section 303(a) as a matter of law. 82 The court narrowly
interpreted section 303(a) under both analyses, holding that architects
are not proper defendants in Title III suits because (1) proper
defendants as defined in the statute include only persons who both
"design and construct ' ' 3 a facility, 84 and (2) liability is limited to
owners, lessees, lessors, or operators.8

PVA did not, however, result in uniform holdings regarding
architects' liability under section 303(a). Although six subsequently
reported cases have addressed liability under section 303(a) of the
ADA, including four initiated by the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
against the hotel chain Days Inns of America,8 6 some have accepted

PVA's analysis in whole or in part, while others have rejected it
entirely.'
B.

M
"[D]esignand [C]onstruct"

9
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Days Inns of America, Inc.8
("8th Circuit DIA") and the Eastern District of California in United
States v. Days Inns of America' ("CaliforniaDIA") followed PVA by
narrowly interpreting the plain language of section 303(a) to insulate
from liability anyone who does not both design and construct a

see generally Jonathan C. Fritts, Note, "Down in Frontl": Judicial Deference,
Regulatory Interpretation, and the ADA's Line of Sight Standard, 86 Geo. L.J. 2653
(1998).
82- See ParalyzedVeterans of Am., 945 F. Supp. at 2 ("[T]he plain language of the
statute makes clear that architects are not covered by §§ 302 and 303 of the ADA.").
83. ADA § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (1994)).
84. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 945 F. Supp. at 2.
85. See id.
86. The four Days Inns decisions resulted from a DOJ investigation of 28 newlyconstructed Days Inns hotels in 17 states. See United States Department of Justice,
Press Release, Justice Department Sues Days Inns Chain for Building Inaccessible
Hotels, at 2 (Feb. 8, 1996) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
foia/diusl.txt>. After entering into settlements with over 23 hotels, the DOJ filed suit
against the remaining five hotels' individual owners, architects, and general
contractors, as well as the franchisor and its parent company. See id. at 2; see also
Days Inns of Am., Inc. v. Reno, 935 F. Supp. 874, 875-76 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (outlining
the history of the Days Inns litigation). Four of the five Days Inns cases resulted in
published decisions. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 151 F.3d 822 (8th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1249 (1999); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc.,
22 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 997 F.
Supp. 1080 (C.D. Ill. 1998); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 8 Am. Disabilities
Cas. (BNA) 491 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-15433 (9th Cir.
Mar. 17, 1998). The other two cases that address liability under section 303(a) did not
involve Days Inns. See United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D.
Minn. 1997); Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
87. See infra Part II.B-C.
88. ADA § 303(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1)).
89. 151 F.3d 822 (1998) (8th CircuitDIA).
90. 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) (CaliforniaDIA).
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grammatical

construction of the phrase "design and construct" to be "distinctly
conjunctive." 92

The court in PVA had relied solely on the

grammatical construction of the plain language of the phrase "design

and construct,"'9 3 and made no mention of policy issues or
congressional intent in enacting the ADA. The courts in 8th Circuit
DIA and CaliforniaDIA followed PVA's holding closely, applying the
"design and construct" language conjunctively to exclude from
liability a franchisor who did not both design and construct hotelsY4
Both courts did so by citing PVA only in footnotes and without

discussion. 95

Again, neither court addressed policy issues or

congressional intent.
The arguments for a broad interpretation of "design and construct,"
however, are persuasive. Congress's inclusion of the word "design"
itself indicates an intent to cast liability on designers. Most architects
serve only as a building's designer and do not also serve as
contractors. 96 If Congress's exclusive focus were only on those
ultimately responsible for the completed facility, the inclusion of the
word "design" would be redundant;97 a more sensible approach in that
case would have been to prohibit only non-compliant construction of
a facility. 98

Moreover, Title III's remedies include a private right of action
91. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 825 n2 (applying the "design and construct"
language conjunctively), rev'g 8 Am. Disabilities Gas. (BNA) 671, 677 (D.S.D. Oct.
29, 1997) (finding that a "designer of a public accommodation or commercial facility
[who is not also a constructor] is by definition liable under § 303 of the ADA");
California DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 492 n.1 (applying the "design and
construct" language conjunctively).
92. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F.
Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996), affd on other groundssub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am.
v. D.C. Arena LP., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 8th CircuitDIA, 151 F.3d at
825 n.2 (applying the "design and construct" language conjunctively); California DL4,
8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 492 n.1 (same).
93. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 945 F. Supp. at 2 ("[TIhe phrase 'design and
construct' is distinctly conjunctive." (quoting ADA § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
12183(a)))).
94. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 825 n.2; California D/A, 8 Am. Disabilities
Cas. (BNA) at 492 n.1.
95. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 825 n.2; California DL4, 8 Am. Disabilities
Cas. (BNA) at 492 n.1.
96. See Murray H. Wright & David E. Boelzner, Quantifying Liability Under the
Architect's Standard of Care, 29 U. Rich. L Rev. 1471, 1473 (1995) (outlining an
architect's usual functions). But see Barry Joseph Miller, Note, The Architect in the
Design-Build Mode" Designing and Building the Case for Strict Liability in Tort, 33
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 116, 125-30 (1982) (addressing the "design-build" approach
under which architects perform both the design and construction functions).
97. See United States's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 19, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997) (Civ. No. 4-96-995) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http'l/www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/
minnl.txt>.
98. See hi. at 18.
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before a facility is built.99 The Act permits an action to be brought by

"any person.., who has reasonable grounds for believing that such
person is about to be subjected to discrimination."'" This provision
evinces Congress's intent to apply the language "design and
construct" to either designers or constructors. 01 For instance, in
Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc.,1°2 the plaintiffs brought such a
suit against the architect of the Broward Arena" before construction

had begun."1 4 The plaintiffs asserted that they had reasonable grounds

to believe that they would be discriminated against because the

architect, Ellerbe Becket, had designed several other arenas in
violation of the ADA. 05 Although the arena had only been designed
and not yet constructed, the court, although without elaboration,
rejected the "design and construct" reasoning in PVA and denied the
architect's motion to dismiss." 6
To read section 303(a)'s "design and construct" language so literally
as to impose liability only on those who both design and construct a
facility appears to defeat Congress's intent. Under this literal reading,
the DOJ has argued that as long as a facility was designed in
compliance with the provisions of the ADA, the owner and
constructor may freely depart from the design during construction to
eliminate accessible features with impunity, °7 an act for which no one
would be liable. Such a "large loophole" of accountability would
"effectively nullify" section 303(a).108
The Central District of Illinois in United States v. Days Inns of
America, Inc'0° ("Illinois DIA") agreed with this analysis, explicitly
rejecting the holding in PVA that liability under section 303(a) falls
only to those who both design and construct a commercial facility. 10

99. See ADA § 308(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (1994)).
100. Id.
101. See United States's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 18 n.12, Ellerbe Becket (Civ. No. 4-96-995).

102. 963 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
103. Broward Arena is the home of the National Hockey League's Florida
Panthers.
104. See Johanson,963 F. Supp. at 1176.

105. See id. at 1177.
106. See id. at 1178. But see Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket
Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (dismissing the architects
from liability under section 303(a) because they did not both design and construct the
MCI Center, even though the arena was still under construction and not yet
completed), affd on other grounds sub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C.

Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
107. See United States's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 18, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997) (Civ. No. 4-96-995) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http:/lwww.usdoj.govlcrt/foial
minnl.txt>.
108. Id.
109. 997 F. Supp. 1080 (C.D. 111. 1998) (Illinois DIA).
110. See id. at 1083.
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In Illinois DIA, the DOJ sued the franchisor, owner, and architect,
alleging that a hotel in Champaign, Illinois was designed and
constructed in non-compliance with the ADA.'
The owner and
architect settled with the DOJ,"2 leaving Days Inns as defendant. The3
court then dismissed Days Inns' Motion for summary judgement,"
finding that PVA's design and construct interpretation afforded a
"narrow, literal" reading of section 303(a) which is "inappropriate to
14
carry out the intent of the ADA.'

Additional guidance in interpreting section 303(a)'s statutory
language is found in courts' interpretations of a similar provision in
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 19881' ("FHAA"). Congress,
in enacting the ADA, consciously incorporated exact language from
the FHAA into several provisions of the ADA to obtain an analogous
and consistent statutory scheme.116 The "design and construct"
language contained in section 303(a) of the 1990 ADA resembles
nearly identical language in the 1988 FHAA. Under the FHAA, "in
connection with the design and construction of covered multifamily
dwellings," discrimination includes "a failure to design and construct"
in compliance with accessibility requirements."' The FHAA, like
ADA section 303(a), contains no language limiting liability for
designing and constructing non-compliant buildings to specified
categories of defendants.118 Liability under the FHAA is guided solely
by the phrase "design and construct."
Two courts have addressed the "design and construct" provision of
the FHAA. Both have refused to apply PVA's textual reasoning to
the FHAA provision, instead arriving at a broader reading of the
FHAA. n 9 In United States v. Hartz Construction Co.," the plaintiff
111. See Complaint, Illinois DIA (No. 96-2028) (visited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialdiill.txt>.
112. See Consent Order and Final Judgement as to Defendants Panchal & Patel,
Inc., and Brian J. Pape, Illinois DIA (No. 96-2028) (visited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foialdiil2.txt>.
113. Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. at 1085.
114. Id. at 1083; see also id.("[PVA] correctly notes that the 'and' in 'design and
construct' is a conjunctive term, but does this obvious grammatical truth necessarily
require a narrow literal reading of liability?").
115. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
116. See, eg., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 117, 120 (1990) (explaining that
FHAA phrases such as "readily accessible to and usable by" and "structurally
impracticable" were purposely incorporated into the ADA), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,400,403; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 69-71 (1989) (same).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(3) (1994).
118. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3604; see also Robert G. Schwemm, Housing
Discrimination: Law and Litigation § 12.3(1), at 12-22 (8th release 1998) (stating that
the FHAA's provisions "simply declare certain housing practices to be unlawful
without specifying who may be held responsible for these practices" and that "anyone
[who is not specifically exempted and] who commits one of the acts proscribed by the
statute's substantive provisions is liable to suit").
119. See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d
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sued the architect and general contractor of a condominium

development alleging inadequate accessibility to individuals with
disabilities in a variety of aspects of the residential units."' The
architect relied on PVA's grammatical arguments to support his
motion to dismiss.1 2 The court, however, held that "the notion that

[the builder and the architect] working together, one performing the
first function and the other performing the second function, [are]
thereby insulated from liability is a frank absurdity. '123 Similarly, in
Baltimore Neighborhoods Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc.,124 a non-

profit corporation, which promotes equal housing opportunities, and a
disabled individual who uses a wheelchair for mobility sued the
general contractor of a condominium development, alleging violations
of the accessibility requirements of the FHAA. 25 The contractor
argued that PVA's narrow interpretation of the ADA's "design and
construct" language should be utilized to interpret the FHAA as
well.2 6 The court, however, rejected PVA's approach, finding that to
conclude that liability can attach only to one who both designs and

constructs "would defeat the purpose of the FHAA." 127
A broader reading of "design and construct" is also consistent with
the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in interpreting the ADA to
include as disabled those with asymptomatic HIV. In Bragdon v.
Abbott,1" the Court relied heavily on the fact that at the time the
ADA was enacted, the then-existing Rehabilitation Act,129 on which
the ADA's definition of disability was based, had consistently been
interpreted to include asymptomatic HIV. 3 ° The Court held that
"[w]hen administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the
661, 664 (D. Md. 1998) (finding PVA's reasoning "unpersuasive" and rejecting the
contractor's motion for summary judgement); United States v. Hartz Constr. Co., No.
97-C-8175, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 973, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 26, 1998)
("disagree[ing] totally" with PVA and rejecting the architect's motion to dismiss).
120. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 973.
121. See id. at *1-2.
122. See id. at *2.
123. Id. at *3.
124. 3 F. Supp. 2d 661.
125. See id. at 661-62.
126. See id. at 662, 664.
127. Id. at 664. The court in BaltimoreNeighborhoods attempted to distinguish the
holding in the ADA case of PVA from the contradictory rulings in the FHAA cases
by noting that there is "no express limitation on possible defendants in the [FHAA]
like there is in the [ADA]." Id. If one accepts, however, that ADA section 302(a)'s
language limiting possible defendants to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators of
places of public accommodation does not apply to section 303(a)'s new construction
provisions, see infra Part II.C, then Baltimore Neighborhoods need not be
distinguished from PVA. Rather, the arguments in Baltimore Neighborhoods for
"and" meaning "or" should logically apply to ADA cases as well, suggesting that
PVA was wrongly decided.
128. 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998).
129. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 to 794-d (1994).
130. See Bragdon, 118 S.Ct. at 2207-09 (1998).
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meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same
language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well."t' l
The record of interpretation of the "design and construct" language of
the FHAA was at the time of the ADA's passage nowhere near as
definitive as interpretations of HIV as a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act.m Nevertheless, Congress's passage of the FHAA
in 1988 with no ambiguity as to possible defendants and subsequent
passage two years later of the ADA with nearly identical language
signals its intent to treat the two statutory schemes similarly.'"
The text of section 303(a) referring to the liability of those who
"design and construct" facilities is, undoubtedly, sufficiently
ambiguous to have elicited contradictory interpretations. When
considering congressional intent and the viability of the ADA as an
effective piece of legislation, however, "design and construct" must be
read in its broader interpretation. To do otherwise would be to
interpret the phrase "design and construct" as intentionally exempting
from liability both the designers and the constructors of the
overwhelming majority of commercial facilities in this countryfacilities which are not, nor historically have been, designed and
constructed by the same party.
C. Owners, Lessees, Lessors, and Operators
Courts have also struggled with the question of whether section
303(a)'s explicit reference to section 302(a) 134 limits liability to the
same enumerated list of possible defendants as those listed in section
302(a), that is: to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators. In
addressing this larger issue of statutory construction, the Eastern
District of Kentucky in United States v. Days Inns of America, Inc.135
("Kentucky DIA") and the Eastern District of California in California
DIA followed PVA, narrowly interpreting the language of section
303(a) to restrict liability only to owners, lessees, lessors, and
131. Id. at 2208.
132. Compare Baltimore Neighborhoods,Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 664 (noting that the
FHAA regulations "do not specify the parties who may be liable"), with Bragdon, 118
S. CL at 2208 (noting the "unwavering line of administrative and judicial
interpretation" of HIV as a disability under the Rehabilitation Act).
133. See Brief for the United States as Appellant at 30, United States v. Days Inns
of Am., Inc., No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Filed Oct. 13, 1998) (arguing that the identical
"design and construct" language in the ADA and FHAA "should generally be
interpreted consistently where both statutes address a similar subject matter and serve
common goals" (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84
(1992); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,756 (1979))).
134. See ADA § 303(a) ("[A]s applied to public accommodations and commercial
facilities, discrimination for purposes of section 302(a) includes... a failure to design
and construct facilities... that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities...." (emphasis added)) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 12183(a)).
135. 22 F. Supp. 2d 612 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (Kentucky DIA).
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operators of newly constructed buildings by directly
transferring the
36
language of section 302(a) into section 303(a).

In both cases, the DOJ had sued the hotels' builders, architects,
owners, and the franchisor. 137 The DOJ alleged that the newly
constructed hotels in Hazard, Kentucky, and Willows, California, did
not comply with ADA accessibility requirements. 38 The architects,
builders, and owners settled the suits against them, leaving only Days
Inns as a defendant.1 39 Citing PVA, both courts held that, regardless
of whether Days Inns designed or constructed the hotels, because it

was not the owner, lessee, lessor, or operator, and therefore could not
be held liable.140 Because section 303(a) states that "discrimination
for the purposes of section 302(a) includes a failure to design and
construct facilities.., that are readily accessible... and usable, 41
these courts held that section 303(a) strictly
incorporates section
42
302(a)'s enumeration of possible defendants.

This transference is contradicted, however, by the inapplicability of
136. See id. at 615-16 (holding that section 303(a) is limited to owners, lessees,
lessors, and operators); United States v. Days Inns of Am. (California DIA), 8 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 493-94 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) (same), appealdocketed,
No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1998).
137. See Complaint at 1, Kentucky DIA (No. 96-26) (visited Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/ctr/foia/dikyl.txt>; Complaint at 2, California DIA (No. Civ. S96-260) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ctr/foia/ dicall.txt>.
138. For detailed lists of the alleged non-compliant features of the hotels and hotel
rooms, see Complaint at 6-9, Kentucky DIA (No. 96-26); Complaint at 6-8, California
DIA (No. Civ. S-96-260).
139. See Consent Order and Final Judgement as to Defendants Hazard
Management Group, Inc., J. Douglas Kidd, and Napier & Sebastian Construction at
2, Kentucky DIA (No. 96-26) (settling with the owner, architect, and general
contractor) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ctr/foia/diky2.txt>; Consent
and Final Judgement as to Defendant Iyer and Associates at 4, California DIA (No.
Civ. S-96-260) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ctr/foia/dical2.txt>;
Consent Order and Final Judgement Dismissing Claims of the United States Against
Dilip Patel at 6, CaliforniaDIA (No. Civ. S-96-260) (settling with the owner) (visited
Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ ctr/foia/dical3.txt>; Consent Order and Final
Judgment against Defendant R.E. Huffman, Inc. at 5(A), CaliforniaDIA (No. Civ. S96-260) (settling with the general contractor), (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/ctr/foia/dical4.txt>.
140. Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 617; CaliforniaDIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas.
(BNA) at 495.
141. ADA § 303(a) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (1994)).
142. See Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 615 ("[S]ection 303 itself refers back to §
302 in a manner that makes it clear that the prohibitions relating to new construction
apply to owners, operators, lessors, and lessees."); CaliforniaDIA, 8 Am. Disabilities
Cas. (BNA) at 493 ("Section 303(a) depends on § 302(a) for prohibitory language.
Therefore, § 303(a) must incorporate the language of § 302(a)."); see also Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1996) ("[Section] 303 defines 'discrimination for the purposes of § 302(a).'
Therefore, the limitation in § 302 to owners, operators, and lessors also applies to §
303 and thereby excludes architects from liability under the section." (quoting ADA §
303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)))), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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section 302(a)'s specific prohibitions to section 303(a)'s broader
category of applicable commercial facilities.143 In 8th Circuit DIA,
Illinois DIA, Johanson, and United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc."
("Ellerbe"), the courts observed that section 302(a)'s enumerated list
of defendants restricts liability to "any person who owns, leases (or
1 45
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."
Thus, the

direct importation of this list of possible defendants into section
303(a) would have section 303(a) apply only to owners, lessees,
lessors, and operators of places of public accommodation, when,
however, section 303(a)'s new construction provisions apply to all
commercial facilities including office buildings and factories'1
Indeed, by transferring the list of defendants into section 303(a), no
entity would be liable for the new construction or alteration of office
buildings and factories. 47 Such an "inexplicable gap in coverage"
would "render] meaningless" section 303(a)'s inclusion of
commercial facilities." Thus, the list from section 302(a) could only
be transferred to section 303(a) if section 302(a)'s phrase "owns,

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation' 4 9

is not transferred literally, but is instead rewritten as "owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates commercial facilities."'- Such a reading,
however, would contradict the plain-language argument that is the
basis for the narrow interpretation in the first place.'5'
143. Section 302(a) only applies to places of public accommodation. See ADA §
302(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
144. 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997).
145. ADA § 302(a) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
146. See id § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)); see also supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
147. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (8th Circuit DIA), 151 F.3d 822,
825 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The practical application of [the defendant's] interpretation
would leave no entity liable for violations of the new construction accessibility
standards for buildings which are commercial facilities only."), cert. denied 119 S. Ct.
1249 (1999); United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (Illinois DIA), 997 F. Supp. 1080,
1084 (C.D. IM.1998) ("The defendants... argue for a judicial transference of
statutory language which when accomplished would make it conceivable that no
entity would be liable for construction of a new commercial facility which violates the
ADA." (quoting Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1268 (quoting Johanson v. Huizenga
Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175,1178 (S.D. Fla. 1997)))).
148. See 8th CircuitDIA, 151 F.3d at 825 (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S.
103,109-10 (1990)); EllerbeBecket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 (same).
149. ADA § 302(a) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
150. See 8th CircuitDIA, 151 F.3d at 825 (declining to transfer section 302(a)'s list
of defendants into section 303(a)); Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. at 1084 (same); Ellerbe
Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267-68 (same); Johanson, 963 F. Supp. at 1178 (same).
151. See 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F.3d at 825 (holding that transferring section 302(a)'s
"owns, leases (or leases to), or operates" language without also transferring "a place
of public accommodation" would "violateol the maxim of statutory interpretation that
courts should give effect to the plain language of the statute" (citing Western Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 65 F.3d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1995)));
Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. at 1084 ("The inclusion of that language in the new
construction of commercial facilities provisions would negate the plain language of
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The distinctions between the two categories of facilities covered by
sections 302152 and 303153-existing places of public accommodation

versus newly constructed commercial facilities, each with its own
standards

for

accessibility

requirements'51--highlight

the

appropriateness of differentiating between categories of defendants.

5

Section 302 defines various unlawful activities, including the
imposition of discriminatory eligibility criteria, failure to modify
policies and practices, failure to provide auxiliary aids and services, as
well as the failure to remove existing architectural barriers from
places of public accommodation. 56 The nature and scope of these
prohibited acts is broad and varied, thus making appropriate the
imposition of liability on a limited and easily identifiable list of
individuals such as owners, lessees, lessors, and operators. 57 Section

303, by contrast, defines one category of unlawful activity, the design
and construction of non-compliant facilities. 158
The parties
responsible for complying with section 303 are evident from the
nature of the activity itself, as "the definition of the prohibited activity
inherently carries with it an identification of the responsible
parties,' 1 59 such as architects.

Courts using congressional-intent arguments in applying a strict

the statute and would require a [c]ongressional intent analysis on the part of the
court."); Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 (holding that such a reading would
"undercut[]... [the] 'plain language' logic" which is the basis for judicial transference
of section 302(a)'s prohibitory language into 303(a)). But see United States v. Days
Inns of Am. (CaliforniaDIA), 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491,494 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
12, 1998) (arguing for a restructured reading in order to eliminate the suggested gap
in coverage and finding such a reading consistent with Congress's clear intent), appeal
docketed, No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1998).
152. See ADA § 302 (relating to existing places of public accommodation) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12182).
153. See id. § 303 (relating to newly-constructed commercial facilities including
places of public accommodation) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183).
154. See supra Part I.A.
155. But see United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (Kentucky DIA), 22 F. Supp.
2d 612, 615-16 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (holding that because sections 301 and 303 "deal with
the same subject, they are to be read in pari materia and harmonized" (quoting Jones
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Realty Co., 728 F.2d 257, 262 (6th Cir. 1984))); California
DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 493 & n.6 (concluding that because "[t]he
distinction between sections 302(a) and 303(a) reflects the cost difference of new
construction as opposed to retrofitting," and that the statute "does not differentiate
between the parties held to those higher standards... the liability provisions remain
the same").
156. See ADA § 302(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)).
157. See United States's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 13, United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997) (No. 4-96-995) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/
minnl.txt>.
158. See ADA § 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)).
159. United States's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 13-14, Ellerbe Becket (No. 4-96-995).
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reading of section 303(a)'" as a basis for excluding architects from
liability have relied on reasoning that could just as easily be used to
arrive at opposite and more persuasive interpretations. For example,
because an earlier draft of the ADA included the provisions now in
sections 302(a) and 303(a) as part of the same section,16' these courts
held that the two enacted sections were initially intended to operate as
one, and the limitation of liability to owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators in section 302(a) should thus be interpreted as applying to
both sections."6 Conversely, however, these same facts could more
plausibly be read to demonstrate that the two provisions were
intentionally separated in order to distinguish between them and the
parties liable pursuant to them. That the phrase "owns, leases (or
leases to), and operates" appears in the legislative history only when
referring to places of public accommodation's reinforces this latter
conclusion.
Similarly, the court in Kentucky DIA held that section 303(a)'s lack
of explicit reference to liable parties evinced Congress's intent to
incorporate section 302(a)'s list of possible defendants into section
303(a), 64 even though the same reasoning could be used to conclude
the opposite. In looking to a provision in Title II of the ADA that
holds parties liable for constructing inaccessible rail stations,' the
court noted that liability under that provision is ascribed only to those
with "control over the selection, design, construction, or alteration of
the property."'" The court then concluded that because Congress
knew how in Title II to impose liability for non-compliant design and
construction to persons other than owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators,167 the omission of similar language from Title M's section
160. See Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 616-17 (limiting liability under section
303(a) to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators); California DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities
Cas. (BNA) at 493-94 (same).
161. See S.933, 101st Cong. § 402 (May 9, 1989). Section 402 of Senate Bill 933
eventually became sections 302 and 303 of the ADA. See S. 933, 102d Cong. §§ 302,
303, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
162. See Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 615 ("Based on similarities in the
purpose and in the drafting of 99 302 and 303, it is apparent to this Court that
Congress intended to limit liability under § 303 to owners, operators, lessors, and
lessees."); California DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 493 n.6 ("The two
sections were intended to operate as one, so the liability provisions apply to both.").
163. See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
164. See Kentucky D!A, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 616 ("[Section] 303 is devoid of any
additional entity that is subject to compliance with ADA standards.").
165. See ADA § 242(e)(1) ("It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of
section 202 of this Act... for a person to build a new station for use in intercity or
commuter rail transportation that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities.... ") (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12162(e)(1) (1994)).
166. Id. § 241(6) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12161(6)); California DLA, 8 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 494.
167. See California DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 494 ("Congress thus
knew how to impose precisely [liability under section 303(a) to persons other than
owners, lessees, lessors, and operators].").
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303(a) is presumed intentional. 16 Again, however, using the court's
own reasoning, the precisely opposite conclusion would be equally
valid. The "disparate... exclusion" of language found in section
302(a)'s terms "any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or
operates" from section 303(a) could be interpreted as proof "that
Congress act[ed] intentionally and purposely"'169 to treat the two
sections differently.
The legislative history of the ADA reveals that, contrary to courts'

narrow interpretations, section 303(a)'s reference to section 302(a) 70
was not added for the purpose of transferring section 302(a)'s list of
possible defendants 171 to section 303(a). 72 In the Senate's 1989
version of the bill, section 302(a) did not yet include a list of possible
defendants. 7 3 Significantly, however, section 303(a) of the same 1989
bill already referenced the "'discrimination' as used in section
302(a)." 74 Thus, the 1989 bill would have made the design and
construction of new facilities 75 discrimination without restriction to
particular types of defendants. The House later inserted into section
302(a) the phrase "owns, leases (or leases to), or operates" for the
particular purpose of expanding the scope of liability for places of
public accommodation to include not only the owner and operator of
places of public accommodation, but also the owner of the building
that houses the place of public accommodation. 7 6 The insertion of

168. See id. ("[Where Congress] includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."
(quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987) (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)))); see also Kentucky DIA, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 616
("Had Congress intended to extend liability further in [section] 303, it could have
easily done so.").
169. CaliforniaDIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 494.
170. See ADA § 303(a) ("[A]s applied to public accommodations and commercial
facilities, discrimination for purposes of section 302(a) includes ... a failure to design
and construct facilities ... that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities ....
(emphasis added)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)).
171. Owners, lessees, lessors, and operators of places of public accommodation
constitute this list. See id. § 302(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
172. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
173. See S. 933, 101st Cong., § 302(a) (Sept. 6, 1989), reprinted in 135 Cong. Rec.
19,823, 19,827 (1989).
174. Id. § 303(a) (emphasis added), reprinted in 135 Cong. Rec. 19,823, 19,828
(1989).
175. The categories of new facilities covered by section 303(a) of the September 6,
1989 version of the bill included new "public accommodation[s]" and "potential
place[s] of employment." Id. These categories of facilities were later changed to the
more general "commercial facilities" to eliminate confusion with Title I's employment
provisions. See 136 Cong. Rec. 11,467, 11,473 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
176. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 55 (1990) ("This amendment makes it
clear that the owner of the building which houses the public accommodation, as well
as the owner or operator of the public accommodation itself, has obligations under
this Act."), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 478; 136 Cong. Rec. 11,425, 11,452
(1990) (statement of Rep. Fish) (substantially same).
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the list does not appear to have been intended to limit defendants for
non-compliant design and construction of the larger category of
commercial facilities.
Interestingly, none of the courts that have addressed the issue of
whether section 303(a) is limited to owners, lessees, lessors, or
operators has relied on the DOJ's interpretation of liability,n which
requires that all parties involved in the design and construction of new
facilities conform their involvement, whatever its scope, to the
requirements of the ADA.17 When confronted with an ambiguous
statute, courts may give deference to agency interpretations.17 9 The
court in CaliforniaDIA, however, followed PVA in choosing not to
defer to these regulations, finding Congress's clear intent to limit
section 303(a) to the owners, lessees, lessors, and operators
enumerated in section 302(a).'8
Ironically, the courts in Illinois DLA and Ellerbe relied on the same
argument-that the intent of the statute is clear and thus deference to
agency interpretations is unwarranted-to reach the exact opposite
conclusion, finding that Congress clearly intended that section 303(a)
not be limited to the defendants enumerated in section 302(a).'8 1
Arguably, because several courts have used the same intent argument
to arrive at opposite results, the statute may not be wholly
unambiguous. m As such, deference to the DOJ's interpretation,
177. But see United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 nA (D.
Minn. 1997) (stating in dicta that had the court been unable to determine Congress's
intent from the plain language of the statute, it would have deferred to the DOJ's
interpretation).
178. See Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Title M Technical Assistance Manual Covering
Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, 111-5.1000, at 46 (Nov. 1993)
[hereinafter ADA TechnicalAssistance Manua].

179. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837,843 (1984).
180. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (California DIA), 8 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 494 n.8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) ("Deference to the

interpretation of the Department of Justice is unwarranted here. Congressional
intent on the question of liability for violations of the new construction requirements

in public accommodations is clear."), appeal docketed, No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar. 17,

1998); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs,
P.C., 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that deference to the DOJ's

interpretation is unwarranted "[b]ecause the plain language of the statute makes clear
that architects are not covered by [sections] 302 and 303 of the ADA"), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena LP., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).
181. See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc. (Illinois DIA), 997 F. Supp. 1080,

1084 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that the plain language of the statute did not limit
liability under section 303(a) to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators, and

thus not

applying a "[c]ongressional intent analysis"); Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 &
n.4 (finding that the plain language of the statute did not limit liability under section
303(a) to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators, and refusing to defer to the DOJ's
interpretation under Chevron).

182. Compare Illinois DIA, 997 F. Supp. at 1084 (holding that the plain language of
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which holds an architect liable for non-compliant design under section
303(a), 183 would be appropriate. 11
Statutory interpretations that find architects liable for
discrimination under section 303(a) are consistent with both the
statutory language of the ADA and with congressional intent. The
next part examines the broader issue of the architect's role in building
design and concludes that this too supports finding architects liable
under the ADA.
III. THE ARCHITECT'S ROLE: WHY LIABILITY UNDER THE ADA Is
APPROPRIATE

This part examines the role of the architect in the design and
construction process and concludes that both precedent and public
policy rationales argue for holding architects responsible under
section 303(a) for the design of commercial facilities not in
compliance with the ADA.
Architects' liability to third parties for negligent design is now a
firmly rooted concept in American law."'5 Although under the
common law doctrine of privity, architects once had a duty only to
those with whom they contracted, 1s 6 this precedent began to erode

with the seminal 1916 decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co."7
MacPherson led to a series of decisions that ultimately established
architects' liability in tort to foreseeable users of the buildings they
negligently design.tm Because under the simple-negligence construct
the statute does not limit liability under section 303(a) to owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators), and Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 & n.4 (same), with California
DIA, 8 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 494 n.8 (holding that the plain language of the
statute limits liability under section 303(a) to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators),
and Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 945 F. Supp. at 2 (same).
183. See ADA Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 178, 111-5.1000, at 46.
184. See Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267 n.4 (noting that deference to the
DOJ's interpretation would be appropriate absent clarity in the statutory language).
185. See William David Flatt, Note, The Expanding Liability of Design
Professionals,20 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 611, 615 (1990) ("The relegation of the privity
requirement and the acceptance rule to the dustbin of history cleared the way for the
modem approaches to design professional liability.., on the theory of negligence in
tort."); see also infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
186. See James Acret, Architects and Engineers 36-38 (3d ed. 1993) (describing the
privity of contract defense by design professionals as the "old rule" which has since
been rejected in most jurisdictions).
187. 111 N.E. 1050, 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916) (holding an automobile manufacturer
responsible for injuries sustained by a rider when the defective wooden spokes of a
wheel manufactured by an independent supplier crumbled into fragments on an
automobile that it manufactured but did not sell to plaintiff).
188. See, e.g., Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895, 898-99 (N.Y.
1957) (abandoning the privity doctrine for architects and subjecting them to tort
liability for negligent design). Most jurisdictions reject a strict liability standard for
architects and engineers. See Flatt, supra note 185, at 622-25 (discussing courts'
reasoning in rejecting strict liability for design professionals). But see id. at 619-22 &
n.58 (noting that some states impose implied warranties that can be tantamount to a

1999]

ARCHITECTS' LIABILITY UNDER THE ADA

161

architects are held liable to persons in the absence of privity, it is both

reasonable and appropriate for a civil rights law to apply the same or a
higher standard.
The responsibilities of architects for code-compliance are clearly
defined and significant. Architects may not violate building code or
other construction requirements, even at the client's request, 18 nor, in
most jurisdictions, may architects delegate design functions to nonprofessionals, such as owners. 190 Indeed, an architect who heeds the
demand of an owner to design a building in an unauthorized (perhaps
less expensive) way is held liable for professional misconduct under
applicable ethical codes. 191 The responsibility for proper building
design is thus ascribed not to clients, who may have limited knowledge
of design regulations and little incentive to meet them, but to licensed
architects, whose "training and professional status place them in the
best position to protect the public by assuring that their designs
1
safeguard life, health, and property to the fullest extent possible." 2

State ethics codes stipulate that the architect's "duty to the public
[i]s higher than any other."'19 Consistent with this responsibility is a
broad reading of the ADA's section 303(a),19 which would hold an
strict-liability standard). See generally Miller, supra note 96, at 117 (arguing for strict
liability where the architect acts as both the designer and the general contractor).
189. See Brian M. Samuels, Construction Law 125 (1996) (describing the problems
associated with clients' attempts to compromise design professionals' judgment); see
also, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 29.1(b)(1) (1997) (defining
unprofessional conduct as the "negligent failure to comply with substantial provisions
of Federal, State or local laws, rules or regulations governing the practice of the
profession").
190. See Acret, supra note 186, at 23-24 (discussing the doctrine of non-delegable
duty, under which an "architect's duty to exercise professional ... judgment is
nondelegable); see also, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 29.1(b)(10) (1997)
(defining unprofessional conduct as the delegating of professional responsibilities to
non-professionals).
191. See Samuels, supra note 189, at 125. Architects are frequently in the position
of working for clients desiring the most inexpensive buildings possible. Many such
clients might, were it permitted, take a calculated risk and instruct the architect not to
comply with certain codes. Because the architect is a licensed professional,
accountable to the public and to her licensing board for substandard design, she must
refuse such requests.
192. Flatt, supra note 185, at 615. For example to be licensed to practice
architecture in New York, an individual must generally receive a bachelor or master
of architecture degree, undergo a three-year post-graduate internship, and pass a
rigorous four-day examination. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ 69.1-69.2
(1995). The uniform "Architect Registration Exam," given in all fifty states, tests not
only prospective architects' knowledge of fire safety, structural support systems,
construction materials and methods, mechanical and ventilation systems, site
planning, and design, see David Kent Ballast, 2 Architecture Review Exam: NonStructural Topics xix-xx (4th ed. 1998), but also their ability to design spaces
accessible to persons with physical disabilities, see itd at 8-1 ("Barrier-free design is an
important part of the [Architecture Review Exam], especially since the [ADA]
became law....").
193. Samuels, supra note 189, at 125.
194. See supra Part II.B-C (arguing for a broad reading of section 303(a) that
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architect liable for discrimination in designing commercial facilities
without accessibility features such as elevators or ramps. Holding
only owners liable, and permitting them to then sue architects
separately for damages under state tort law, would place architects in
the untenable position of being able to contract away their stateimposed ethical obligations to the public, and put compliance with the
ADA at risk by allowing building owners to take calculated risks that
non-compliant designs would escape suit. No life-safety building code
requirement would be treated in this manner, nor should the
accessibility requirements of the ADA.
Exempting architects from liability under the ADA would serve not
only to treat architects differently than other licensed professionals,
but to treat the ADA as something less than other civil rights laws. If
a licensed real estate professional, for example, accedes to the request
of a building owner to show her apartments only to persons of certain
ethnic groups, both the owner and the broker would be guilty of
discrimination, the broker not less so because her client had requested
it.195 Similarly, an employment agency illegally agreeing not to refer
applicants of certain religions is not relieved of a claim of
discrimination merely because it was complying with the employer's
request.196 So, too, in the context of the design of commercial facilities
not in compliance with the ADA, should architects be susceptible to
claims of discrimination.
From a public policy perspective, finding architects liable for noncompliant design is likely to serve as a powerful deterrent, resulting in
more careful incorporation of ADA standards into the design of
buildings, a greater number of compliant facilities, and thus fewer
lawsuits. Additionally, front-loading the cost of compliance with the
ADA will result in a more efficient allocation of resources by avoiding
the greater cost of reconstructing non-compliant newly-built
facilities. 197 Thus, society as a whole would save the dead-weight costs
associated with rebuilding facilities constructed in non-compliance,
ensuing litigation costs, and not having the use of the structures during
the reconstruction necessary to retrofit them with accessibility
features.
would find anyone who designs or constructs a non-compliant facility guilty of
discrimination, regardless of whether the person was an owner, lessee, lessor, or
operator).
195. See 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 250 (1976 & Supp. 1999) (noting that "where
a realtor, engaging in [discriminatory] conduct, is acting as the agent of a codefendant,
and within the scope of [her] apparent authority, both defendants are liable to the
plaintiff').
196. See generally 45B Am. Jur. 2d Job Discrimination § 1178 (1993) (noting that
"employment agencies are subject to many of the federal and state job discrimination
and other fair employment practices laws").
197. See Steven A. Holmes, Disabled Find Housing Fails On Access Test, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 22, 1999, at Al (noting that it is more cost effective to design buildings in
compliance with accessibility requirements than to retrofit them afterward).
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The courts in Kentucky DIA and California DIA predicted that
defining proper defendants as anyone who designs or constructs a
non-compliant facility would be so expansive that every carpenter,
subcontractor, and material supplier could be liable under section
303(a). 98 The court in 8th CircuitDIA, however, held that the "design
and construct" language of section 303(a) is not overly broad and is
sufficient to guide liability. 99 Adopting the test used in United States
v. Best-foods,' the court provided an appropriate mechanism for
establishing liability, holding that to be liable under section 303(a)'s
"design and construct" language, the defendant must have had "a
significant degree of control over the final design and construction of
a facility."' 1
Architects, granted virtual monopolies in providing the service of
safe building design in most jurisdictions,m possess this significant
level of control, and are thus, by the nature of their role in the design
process and under the terms and intent of the ADA, proper
defendants in a suit alleging discrimination on the basis of building
design in violation of the ADA.
CONCLUSION

Architects are proper defendants in a suit alleging discrimination
resulting from non-compliant building design under section 303(a) of
the ADA. The hypertextual interpretations set forth by some courts
in order to restrict architects' liability are not only susceptible to
opposite and arguably more persuasive interpretations using identical
facts and reasoning, but fail to take into account Congress's intent in
enacting the ADA.
As with many civil rights law controversies, courts' varying
approaches to the ADA appear to turn in part upon fundamental
differences in the conception of government. A parking violations
19& See United States v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 612,615 (E.D. Ky.
1998) (subcontractors and material suppliers); United States v. Days Inns of Am., 8
Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491, 492-93 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1998) (individual
carpenters), appeal docketed, No. 98-15433 (9th Cir. Mar 17,1998).
199. See United States v. Days Inns of An., Inc. (8th Circuit DIA), 151 F.3d 822,
826 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1249 (1999).
200. 118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998). In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court held that a parent
company could be held liable for its subsidiary's violation of environmental laws if the
parent company "manage[d], direct[ed], or conduct[ed] operations specifically related
to," the environmental law. See idat 1887.
201. 8th Circuit DIA, 151 F3d at 826. Oddly, despite the court's broad reading of
section 303(a) as not limiting liability to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators, it
adopted PVA's narrow requirement that only those who both design and construct
may be liable under section 303(a). See id.
at 825 n.2.
202. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 7302 (McKinney 1985) ("Only a person licensed or
otherwise authorized to practice under this article shall practice architecture or use
the title 'architect."'); see also id § 6512 (making unauthorized practice a felony).
Engineers carry similar responsibilities. See supra note 1.
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administrative law judge once said to me, in dismissing a parking
ticket because it had been filled out incorrectly, "Before I use the
power of government against people, the government had better
make sure it at least filled the forms out properly." To some extent,
this quote summarizes what judicial disputes concerning civil rights
boil down to: Is Congress, in writing law, using the power of
government against people (building owners, lessees, lessors, and
operators, for example) or for people's benefit (the disabled)?
In examining rulings limiting liability under the ADA to the
narrowest possible category of defendants, it is difficult to conclude
that this question of basic philosophy did not play a significant role.
These rulings, to be consistent with congressional intent, would have
to assume that Congress enacted the ADA with the goal of making
discrimination against the disabled legal in the overwhelming majority
of the nation's public and commercial facilities, yet inexplicably
prohibiting inaccessibility to the disabled only in the small fraction of
such structures designed, constructed, and owned by the same party.
Such a law would have less to do with providing access for the
disabled than with discouraging that particular category of building
ownership. Courts, instead, essentially threw out the ticket because it
was not filled out properly. When the Supreme Court is reduced to
relying on definitions from Webster's Dictionary23° and on discussion
of the ADA's use 2of the "present indicative" tense of the verb
"substantially limits" to contradict intentions explicitly stated in the
ADA's House and Senate Reports, 20 5 it is not interpreting the ADA,
it is grammatically circumventing it.

203. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (1999) (citing
the Oxford English and Webster's New World dictionaries to define "substantially
limits"). For a critical analysis of the recent increased use of the dictionary in
Supreme Court statutory construction, see generally Note, Looking It Up:
Dictionariesand Statutory Interpretation,107 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (1994).
204. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47; see also text accompanying notes 48-51
(discussing the Court's reliance on Dictionaries and verb tense in Sutton).
205. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.

